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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTER.! "I DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA 
(Alexandria Division) 
, 
ROSETTA STONE LTD. , , 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
: CIVIL ACTION NO. I:G9cv736 
: (GBLlTCB) 
GOOGLEINC. 
, 
, 
Defendant. 
DECLARATION OF HENRY LIEN IN SUPPORT OF GOOGLE'S REPLY 
MEMOR-'o."'DUM: 
I, Henry Lien, hereby declare as follows: 
I. I am over the age of eighteen. I aql competent to testify to, and have personal 
kno\llledge of, the matters contained herein. 
2. 1 represent Defendant Google Inc. in this aClion. In thai capacity, 1 have gained 
personal knowledge of the facts contained herein, each of which is true and correct 
3. I reviewed the spreadsheet attached as Exhibit C to the Declaration of Jason 
Calhoun In Support of Rosetta Slone Ltd. 's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to 
Liability. Tne spreadsheet identifies 183 ads . I also reviewed Exhibit 50 of the Declaration of 
Margret Caruso submitted with Google's Motion for Summary Judgment That sprec.dshect lists 
.31,093 separate ads that have run on Rosetta Stone marks from the period of2004 through 2009. 
Thus, the 183 ads id<ntified by Mr. Calhoun represent .59% of the ads identified by Google in 
Exhibit 50 over this relevant time period. 
4. Attached to this declaration as Exhibit 1 is a true and correct copy of an excerpt 
from Plaintiff's Post Trial Memorandum from Tiffany (NJ) Inc. 'l. eBay [nc., 04 Civ. 4607 (RJS), 
Docket No. 74, whicb I downloaded from PACER. 
6527 
5. Attaclled to this declaration as Exhibit 2 arc relevant excerpts of Exhibit 50 oft~e 
Declaration of Margret Caruso submitted with Google' s Motion for Summary Judgment These 
excerpts include the entries that appear to correspond with the advertisements identified by 
Rosetta Stone in irs Opposition to Google's Motion far Su"mmary Judgment at pages 21 -22. 
These entries are dated September 2009 like those identified by Rosetta Stone and have the same 
ad text and vis ible URL as the ads identified by Roselti:l Stone at pages 21 -22 of its Opposition. 
6. Attached [0 this declaration as Exhibit 3 is a true and correct copy of a document 
produced by Rosetta Slone in this litigation titled "Rosetta Stone Brand Equity/' dated February 
2009 and bates labeled RS-00012447 to RS-OOOI2458. 
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California and the 
Cotrunonwealrh of Virginia that the foregoing is lrue and correct. Executed this 14 day of April, 
20 I 0, at Redwood Shores, California. 
Henry Lien 
2 
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERc'i DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 
TIFFANY (NJ) INC. and TlFFAt'TY 
AND COMPANY. 
-against-
eBAYINC .• 
04 C;v. 4607 (RiS) 
Plaintiffs, 
Defendant 
PLAINTIFFS' POST-TRIAL MEMORAl'<l>UM 
ARNOLD & PORTER LLP 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
399 Park Avenue 
New York, New York 10022 
(212) 715-1000 
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Zalewska Dec1.1J1I8, 10. The prices of Tiffany silver merchandise sold outside the United States 
do not vary significantly from the prices within the United States. Zalewska Dec!. 'Ii 8: 
B. oBay's Symbiotic Relationship With its Seller Community 
eBay has created and now operates the well·k:nown online marketplace in which eBay's 
member sellers, with extensive assistance from eBay, create listings offering items for sale to 
eBay's member buyers in auction-style, fixed price or "Buy It Now" listings.' Briggs Dec!. ~ 9, 
15. eBay exercises control over who mayor may not tra~e on its website by requiring all users 
to register with eBay and sign eBay's User Agreement Briggs DecL ~ 13; DX 77. If a user 
violates the tenns or conditions of the User Agreement, eBay may take disciplinary action 
against the. seller. including removing the seller's listings, issuing a warning and/or suspending 
the user. Briggs Dec!.; 14. 
eBay exercises control over the items that are listed on its website. DX 77 at 3.4; 
Chesnut Dec!. W 33,35. eBay maintains a list ofp,ohibited items such as drugs, firearms and 
alcohol products. fOT which it routinely screens in order to keep such items from being offered 
for sale on eBay, PX 4. In addition, eBay runs a "fraud engine" that is puI]ionedly designed to 
identify "su,,1>icious" listings that may violate any of aBay's rules, including rules prohibiting the 
.. eBay attempts to argue that there has been a diversiou of, and therefore a secoodary ,markd. for, 
'genuine new Tiffany 3ilver jewehy. eBay Proposed Findings ~152-53 . However, eBay has not come 
forth with any evidence: in SUPPl)rt of chat proposition, and instead relies on pure conjecture. In fact, 
Tiffany has not experienced any diversion of silver jewelry during the tline p:riod of its dispute with 
eBay. See Cepek ·Decl. ~ 15; Chen Dec!. ''I 13-16; Shibley DeCl. 1i'\J 7-9. Indeed, there is little or no 
economic incentive for the diyerS:oD. of Tiffany merchandise into the secoodary mar'.cet. Zalewska Deel. 
1i 8; Chen DecL ~ 15. Consequently, eBay'Ji argument about dive..rsion i.s a red herring and should be 
wholly disregarded. 
sUnder tb.e system created by e8ay, sellers may have multiple listings Cor the same item or one listing 
with multiple quantities of the same item. DX 77 aJ 3; Zalewska Decl. ~ 80. In addition, sellers, who are 
aoonymous to the public, ca."'} sell ibe same goods through multiple user identifications. See Tr. 671: 18-
672:2. . 
-5-
6531 
Case 1:09-cv-00736-GBL-TCB Document 165-1 Filed 04114110 Page 4 of 17 
sale of the counterfeit goods or goods that infringe the trademarks of companies such as Tiffany. 
fr. 581:11-582:12; Chesnut Dec!. ~ 35; OX 125. For a number of years, eBay has used filters 
that car delay Jistings that involve the sole of goods, as well as filters ("at look at qGaIllity and 
price. T!-648:5-648:7, 659:10-661:23, 66'l:4-664:22; PX 342 al 12; PX 378; OX 125. Once the 
engine identifies a listing, eBay employees (known as CSRs) can review that listing to determine . 
whether it should be taken off the eBay website. Tr. 586:17-588:1 0, 589:12-589:24; Chesnut 
Decl. ~38; OX 13. 
eBay has built a business model that is designed to work closely with sellers 10 foster the 
incr~se of their sale of goods 00 eBay, including Tiffany jewelry. Zeig Dep. 141:21-145:4; 
Tr. 406:18-407:25; PX 129; PX 184. In that regard, eBay provides substantial information and 
assistance to seller,. Tr.401:10-401:23 . eBay's revenue is dependent on the growth of sellers' 
sales act],,;ties on e8ay in several ways. Tr.406:18-4-07:25. VVhen an eBay seller lists an item, 
eBay charges the seller an L'lSCrtion Fee, ranging from 5020 to $4.80 depending on the starting 
price, plus a Final Value Fee, ranging from 5.25% to 10% of the final price. Briggs Decl.1i20; 
PX 1151. eBay' s Chief Marketing Officer, Gary Briggs, testified tha~ in 2006, approximately 
33% of eBay North America's income was derived from listing fees and apprcximately 45% 
from v.nal value fees. Tr. 407:3-407:9. eBay also pIIlfits from fees charged by PayPa!, an eBay 
'Company, to process the transaction. Tr . .J93:4-393:16. Payp.l charges the eBay seller a fee 
ranging from \.9% to 2.9% of the sale price, plus $0.30 .. PX 1156. 
This fee structure leads oBay to take affirmative steps designed to increase its sellers' 
sales. Tr.406: 18-407:25. eBay's revenue and profit growth is dependent on these actions. 
Tr. 406:18-407:25. Mr. Briggs testified thaI eBay "wants[s) to have [its] sellers understand what 
-6-
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buyers are interested in, and [it] feel[s] that [it is] very much in the business of trying to help [its] 
seUers succeed." Tr. ~06:23-407:2. 
eBay works with its sellers to pro:vide them with extensive assi;stcmce to help increase 
their sales. Tr.401:10-401:23. eBay conducts seminars and workshops to educate sellers on 
growing their business. Ir. 403:11-403:14; PX 981, PX 989. ,eBayoffers marketing advice 
about creating the "perfect" listing to attract buyers. Tr. 415:20-417:1; PX 1015. eBay offers an 
"Advanced Selling" program that provides its sellers with data and research to help them identify 
''hot sales opportunities." Ir. 406:4-406:17; PX 987. eBay distributes marketing calendars so 
that its sellers can list goods to coincide with eBay promotions: Tr. 409:2-409:19; PX 985. eBay 
provides Uexpert" consultants. whom eBay s~l1ers may calllo receive advice ao growmg their 
business. Tr. 409:25-411:4; PX 990. eBay has even established its Main Street Program, which 
facilitates sellers' lobbying of government officials regarding regulations and legislation that 
may affect their and eBay's businesses. Tr. 413:7-411:22; PX 1024. 
eBay provides its top sellers, known as PowerSellers l with even greater asSist&ice and 
benefits.' Ir.401:10-401:23. As Mr. Briggs testified, the bigger the seller, the more support 
eBay provides. ld. PowerS.llers are provided dedicated accoUDt managers. If. 427:7-427:15. 
eBay publishes newsletters for PowerSellers that provide further information on eBay 
' proplotions and advanced selling education. Ir. 423:6-423 :12; PX 397. At all relevant times, 
eBay offered a CO-<lP advertising program in which it reimbursed PowerSeHers 25% of the 
charges that they incurred for advertisements in qualifying publications. Tr. 423: 17-424:4, 
440:3-440:20; PX 52; PX 397. eBay offered its PowerSellers health care benefits, Ir. 438:19-
AJJ discussed below, counterfeiters have been able to exploit the credibility and luster of being a 
PowerSel1erto sell counterfeit Tifbny silver jewelry. See this Memo at 34~ infra .. 
-7-
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439:20, PX 52, business iiability inS8&!lce, PX 406. and working lines. of credit to finance their 
business. PX 129. 
At all pertinent times, eBay management teams were responsible for overseeing the 
growth of products sold on eBay within each formal product categOlY, such as Jewelry & 
Watches . . Tr.417:9-420:19; Poletti Dep. 13:14-13:22. The Jcwehy & Watches team ·ran an 
account management program for its 20 top sellers. Zeig Dep. 31:\3-35:16, 35:5-37:8; 
Tr.417:9-419:23. That program provided eBay's seUers with information all business planning 
and auction strategy consultation.. Zeig Dep. 31: 13-35: 16; PX 200 at 16. eBay conducted group 
conference calls with sellers, in whlch eBay shared" information on such topics· ~ eBays 
marketing progranis and top-searched keywords: PX 184; ~ PX 200 at 7; Zeig Dep, 117:18-
118: 11. Plaintiffs Exhibit 184, for example, shows that"eBay provided its seller lvith "the most 
effective keywordS for [sellers'] program," including the words that prol1ded the best return on 
investments. eBay identified "Tiffany" as one of the top-searehed keywords that it provided to . 
top seUers during these calls. PX 184. Wben it was enconraging its top sellers to use the 
"Tiffany" key word, the Jewehy & Watch .. toam gave no thought to whether the goods were 
counterfeit. Zeig Dep. 141:99-148: 1. 
In order to "boose' the sellers' sales, eBay continued· to advise its sellers to ta.'e 
advantage of the demand for Tiffany merchandise as part of eBay's effort to grow the Jewelry & 
Watches category. PX 129; 995,1038, 184, 1018,1064,1026; Tr. 457:20-460:3. For instance, 
in 2004, a PowerSeller newsletter to jewelry sellers advised Power ·Sellers to "us[ eJ 
recommended keywords to boost sales." "Tiffany & Co." is among the recommended keywords 
provided. PX 129. eBay pro,ides all its users with, documents such as the "Hot Categories 
Report." PX 995. cBay's description for The Hot Categories Report is: "Hot .. . Very Hot ... 
-8-
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Super Hot! Disa)very ·which categories and ·products are on fire ~ where bid to item rolios are 
high a.~d demand is outpacing supply!" PX 1026; see also PX 287. eBay published a report in 
the Seller Central section of its website i.~ September 2006 that told sellers that "Tiffany" is a 
"hot" ke)~vord among buyers in the Jewehy & Watches category. PX 995. aBay provides its 
users with what it calls the "Holiday Hot List." PX 1018. As Mr. Briggs acla:;owledged, the 
"Holiday Hot List' "suggest[s] to our sellers the ~iPes o[items that our buyeis will have interest 
in during the holiday season. Tr. 457:20-459:3. The Holiday Hot List distributed in the Seller 
Central section of eBay' s website in September 2006 states: '~o help [sellers] prepare, we have 
cr""ted a detailed list of proGucts predicted to be in bigh demand and short Supply this holiday 
season". PX 1026. eBay included "Tiffany" ~n its ''Holiday Hot List." PX 1018. Finally, eBay 
encou. ... ges its seUers to view the eBay Pulse webpage, which tracks buyer treods, ''hot picks," 
"top searches" and "most watched items." PX 1026; Tr.461:4-464:19. Tn September 2006 and 
March 2007, eBay told users that the terms "Tiffany" and ''Tiffany & Co." were top search 
terms. PX 1038, PX 1164. 
eBay recognizes that its "buyers are very interested in brands." Tr.446:21-446:25. In 
order to attract potential bC'Yers to its website, eBay has devoted a sigoificanl effort to assisting 
the growth of eBay sellers .in the Jewehy & Watches category. Tr. 418:11-419:23; Poletti D.p. 
·13 :6·)3:22. Indeed, eBay considers itself to be a competitor of Tiffaoy aod the p~cipal source 
of "value" pricing of Tiffany jewelry. Poletti Dep. 72:19-72:22,74:16-75:13. eBay regularly 
conducts promotions to increase bidding on auctions and to iocrease sales of fashionable and 
luxury brands, including Tiffany. Zeig Dep. 49:15-50:15, 64:5-67:6; PX 61; PX 63. 
Prior to receiving a demand letter from Tiffany in 2003, eBay actively advertised the 
availability of Tiffany merchandise to purchase, by displaying the TIFFANY Marks 00 its 
-9-
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homepage and greeting pages. PX 392; PX 1064. Additionally, eBay purchased sponsored iip.k 
advertisements on Yahoo! and Google advertising the availability of "Tiffany" items. Briggs 
Decl. 'i 25; PX 491; PX 1065. Sometime after Tiffany's pretest in May 2003, eBay advised 
Tiffany that it had ceased purchasing those links. Briggs Decl. 'li/25, 32. Nevertheless, eBay 
continued to reimburse sellers who registered as "affiliates" for buying sponsored links on 
Google that advertised the sale of Tiffany jewelry on eBay because advertisements drove 
business to eBay'" PX 477-480, 482; Tr. 469:4-470:2. 
As a result, cBay has gen-eraled substantial revenues from the sale of "Tiffany" silver 
jewelry since 2000. Poletti Dep. 59:15-62:9. Between April 2000 a.~d August 2005, there were 
456,551 sales of Tiffany jewelry in the Jewelry & Watches cat~goryS PX 394 at I. eBay's 
Jeweh-y and Watches Category Manager estimated tha~ betWeen April 2000 and JUDe ·2004, 
eBayearned $4.1 million in revenue from completed listings with "Tiffany" in the listing title in 
the Jewelry & Watches category. Poletti Dep. 59:15-62.9. , 
C. eBayKnows thatItIS a Principal Source for Counterfeit 
Tiffanv Silver Jewelry 
Sometime in 2003, Tiffany observed that the largest marketplace, by far, for the sale of 
counterfeit Tiffany silver jewelry was eBay. Kowalski Decl ~28; Tr. 841:11-841016. Indeed, it 
brought civil actions against several eBay sellers: KAtz Jewelers, Inc., Stargiam.com, lnc. (which 
Under die "affiHate" program" t1-uit Commission Junction mn on behel.f of eBay. Tr. 469:4-469: 18, 
Commission function reimburSed the affiliate advertiser for directing business to eBay through sponsored 
link advertisements. Briggs Dec!. 1 35; PX 481, 1013; Tr. 469:4-470:2. _Bay provUled the funds usW to 
reimburse these affiliates. Tr. 469:] 9-470:2. ARer it ceased purchasing links itself. eBay never instructed. 
CoIIllllissioD Junction to preclude its affiliates from using ·'Tiffimy" as a sponsored link. Tr. 472:2-
472:19. 
This figure consists of completed sales for the following subcategories: Body Jewelry, Bracelet5. 
Cb2nns & Charm Bracelets. Children's Jewelry, Designer Brands, Eanings, Men's Jewelry, Neckl,ce & 
Pendants, Pins & Brooches, Rings. PX 394. The calculations excjude numerous types o["Tiffany" items 
nol at issue hc~ ~ loose beads, watches, and ethnic and tribal jewelry. 
-10-
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was also criminally prosecuted), Erika Hllg.~es and Dav,d Verbout. Tr. 838:25-840:4; Kowalski 
Ded. ~115- 16. Tiffany also pursued over 600 enforcement .eI'ons. Tr.801:2-801:21. As the 
amount of counterfeit Tiffany silver merchandise available on eBay continued to grow, Tiffany 
made the decisiou that it was not economical to pursue lcgal action agaiust individual sellers of 
coUnterfeit Tiffany merchandise on eBay. Tr. 800:20-805:6. Rather, ,t concluded that ,t was 
most effective to address the problem by confronting eBay. Tr. 804:11 ·805:6,816:23-817:17; 
Kowalski Dec!. ~'122-23. 
In May 2003, Tiffany directed its outside counsel to write eBay to complain about the 
problem of counterfeit Tiffany jewelry on eBay and to seek eBay's cooperation in stopping the 
illegal conduct. Kowalski Decl. 'Il17; PX 489 . . In that letter, Tiflimy advised eBay tbat there are 
no authorized third-party vendors for Tiffany merchandise and that it should therefore ''be 
appa.rent to eBay that any seller of a significant lot - i.e. five pieces or mare - of pmported 
'Tiffany' jewelry is almost certainly selling counterfeit merchandise.'" Kowalski Decl. 'Ii"! 17- . 
18; PX 489. eBay responded by encouraging Tiffany to utilize a third party program, Ranger 
Online, to report counterfeit items to eBay,lO but rebuffed Tiffany's request to remove listings 
for '·Tiffany" items for which the seller bad listed multiple "Tiffany" items. PX 490 . 
• I} TIffa.,v believed that the number "five" was a cODSer'tative estimate as an. indicator that a seller was 
offering cOunterfcit Tmany merchandise. This llUIIlber is based, in part, 00 the facl that Tiffany is 
primarily a gift store and that the pUIchase of multiple items is not common. Tr.795:17-797:2 Also, 
Tiffany bas a liberal return policy \vith a 30-day fuil money-back guarantee. It is thus difficult to imagine 
a circumstance where a seller would sell Dew Tiffany jewelry for subS:an1ially less than retail on eBay. let 
alone 5 or more Tiffany pieces. Tr. 795:17-797:2; Zalewska DecL 121. Based on its experience, 
Tiffany concluded that this yardstick was reliable. Tr. 220:6-220:17. 
10 . Tiffany attempted to use Ranger Online. but found it ineffective because the program. merely 
ccnducted keyword ,earcru:s for Tmany. Tr. 227: 14-228:2 Tiffany still bad to r"';ew the listings 1llld 
report the items to eBay. Tr.227:14-228:2. Moreover, Ranger arum. allowed" rights owner to repoct 
only oue listings! a time and even eBay was not happy with. Ti:ffany~s use afRanger Online. DX 81. 
-11-
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Tiffany then attempted to curtail the problem by participating in eBay's VeRO program_ 
Zalewska Dec!. ~ 22. Tiffany employees monitored eBay, End submitted Notices of Claimed 
Infringement ("NOel's") to eBay for the listings that they had. good faith belief infringed on 
the TIFFANY Marks. ld. '!f35; PX96S. eBay removed the listings at Tiffany's request, but 
apparenily nothing more. Zalewska Dec!. ,43. There is 0,0 evidence, other than unsUbstantiated 
assertions, that eBay actually suspended these seilers even temponarily, much less pennanentIy. n 
Tr. 631 :4-631:9; PX 1136. 
Even after approximately one year of steady reporting to eBay, the number of listings for 
counterfeit Tiffany mercbandise increased. PX 1082; Zalewska DeeL 'i1f 75-76; Kowalski Dec!. 
If 22. From the time of eBay's Juoe 2003 refusal to proluoit sellers from offering five or more 
"Tiffany" items through May 2004, Tiffany reported 46,252 infringing listings. PX 1082." 
-Indeed, by August 2003, Tiffany had catapulted to the top of tbe list of lights GWDers filing 
notices in the VeRO program, and was -the second largest reporter as of that time. DX 81; 
PX92. 
The vast majority of counterfeit "Tiffany" merchandise sold on eBay is of a significantly 
inferior quolity, resulting in a meaningful loss of goqdwill for Tiffany among the purchasers of 
those goods, as evidenced by the numerous complaints that Tiffany received from eBay buyers. 
U eBay proffered conclusory evidence regard.ir;l.g its suspension policies, and asserted that it was its 
practice to suspend repeat sellers of counterfeit goods. Chesnut. Ded. ~ 46. However, even though eBay 
bas the ability to identify ami obtain such inforn1ll!ioD, PiatO' .. ky-Sbapiro Dec!. 'i'j 74-84. eBay claims 
.thaI. it is unable to provide any data regarding the DWUber of individuals that it suspended as a result of 
either Tiffany's NOCI"s or eBay's supposed proactive efforts to review lisfu;lgs for the sale of Tiffany 
jewelry. PX 1136. In other words. eveD though eBay is the sole source of the data and is able to provide 
. that data, it bas failed to proffer any eviden~ that substantiates its claim that if suspended sellers who 
listed counterfeit Tiffany silver jewelry for sale. 
12 The figures from PX 1082 represent only reported listings . Zalewska Declo "J 74. The actual number 
of reported items is greater because a si"gle listing may bave offered multiple "Tiffany" items. Zalewska 
DecL ~ 80; see DX 77 ai 3_ 
-12-
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Lange Dec!. ,/6. Between April 2003 and October 2007, Tiffany's Customer Service 
Department received over 3,900 emails regardi.~g "Tiffany" items on eBay. The majority of the 
emails regarded questions about whether the product was fak. and whether Tiffany was aware of 
the problem. Id. As a result of the numerous people who eacountered counterfeit Tiffa.~y 
merchandise through eBay, the TIFFANY MaIks and Tiffany's reputation as a purveyor ofhigb 
quality jewelry have been diluted and tarnished. Naggiar Decl. '\l':I19-20. 
At the beginning of 2004, in ord.,- to assess the extent of the problem, Tiffany condtrctcd 
• survey, ill which it purchased ai random silver jewelry ifeTUS available on eBay that used 
"TIFFANY sterling" in the listing (the "2004 Buying Program"). Zalewska Decl. 'i"/61 ·62; 
Maotis Decl. ~~ 5,10. In accordance with the Mantis protocol, Tiffany's law finn conducted the 
survey, and purchased 186 pieces af"Tiffany" silver jewelry. Grasso Ded.W3, 33. Tiffany's 
quality management personnel inspected and evaluated each of these items. Callan Decl. rnr 14-
171 31. They found that 136 items, or 73.1%, were cOunterfeit and only 5% were genuine. 
Grasso Decl. 1f 33; Mantis Dec!. ~ 20; PX 434. The balance, 21.9%, was potentially actionable, 
but not pure counterfeits (e."., they were ''imitation''). Mantis DecL '!" 20; PX 434." 
In June 2004, because of the 2004 Buying Program's results and the increasednurnber of 
listings, Tiffany once again wrote to eBay to demand that eBay take action. Kowalski DeeL 
.~ 22; ·PX 492. In the le~er, Tiffany ad.ised eBay about the results of the 2004 Buying 
13 In the Spring of 2005, after this action was commenced. Tiffany repeated its survey. in order to 
determine whether the number of counterfeit items being listed on eBay '?Ontinued to be predominantly 
counteneit (the ''2005 Buying Program'). Gemo Dec!. 11'135.36; Zalew,lci DecL ,66. The results of 
the 2005 Buying.Program were striJdngly similar, as Tiffany's quality management persoilllOl found thllt 
75.5 % o[the 139 it= purchased were co.u!lterfciL Mantis DecL ~ 20; PX 433. 
-13-
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Program." PX 492. Despite the details letter regarding the 2004 BuYing Program, eB.y did Dot 
respond to the letter or show any L.,tercst in learning any information about the 2004 Buying 
Program. Kowalski DecL 11 23. 
Even after Tiffany commenced this action, it continued to p"-cticipate in the VeRO 
program and to advise cBay of the pervasive listing of counterfeit goods. Zalewska Decl. ~'I! 67, 
76-79. In each year from 2003 through 2006, Tiffany reported substantially more listings than it 
did the year prior. PX 1082. In 2003, Tiffany reported 20,915 infringing listings. In 2004, 
Tiffany reported 45,142 infringing listings. In 2005, Tiffany reported 59,012 infringing listings. 
In 2006, Tiffany reported 134,779 infringing listings. Zalewska DeeL ~78; PX 1082; Tr. 97:20-
99:18. As of September 30, 2007, Tiffanyreported 24,201 infringing listings in 2007. Zalewska 
De,cl. '179. All 'told, Tiffany reported 284,149 illfringing listings. Zalewska Decl. '180; 
Tr.195:1·195:8. According to' eBay's own monthly records, of the L4,Ooo rights owners wiro 
participate in the VeRa program, Chesnut DeeL 1)17, Tiffany Wi'S among the top 10 reporters in 
21 of the 28 months between June 2003 and September 2005·. PX 253-283." 
At the same time that Tiffany was complaining to eBay about the sale of ,",unlerfeit 
goods, buyers were also complaining to eBay_ 16 PX 493-645. Based on the limited discovery 
14 The letter's statements regarding the 2004 Buying Program were not general and vague. Rather, the 
letter descnoed the program. to puruhase sterling silver- products at random. in ~rdance with a protocol 
designed by an expert retained by TiJliiny. Fllrther, i\ disclosed tbat 186 pieces were purchased between 
January 26 and February 20, 2004, at prices ranging from $8.95 to $395. Finally, it msclosed that, after 
physically inspecting those goods, Tiffany determined that no less than 73% of the goods were counterfeit 
and that only 5% ofthc gooOs were genuine. See PX 492. 
H eBay's data is incompl~e. For in.stance, PX 282 8.Li.p PX 283, the monthly reports for November a..,d 
December 2005, respectively, inexplicably do not show any notices from Tiffany. See also PX 261 , 276, 
277, 281. In fac~ Tiffany reported 6,932 and 2,024 listings dur.ng those two months, :md thus s."auld 
have been iecorded as the number one reporter in November. PX t 082. 
16 For example, one customer said: "r purchased this Tiffany's ring, w¥ch I now believe is counterfeit 
I have emailed the seller, wiiliout any response. I also I!oticcd that another buyer recently bought a pair of 
earrings from this same seller that also ended'up being counterfeit." PX 641. ' 
-14-
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tilat eBay provided, 125 consumers complained to eBay during the last six weeks of 2004. 
PX 493-645. In.addition, the court has heard testimony from individual,s regarding the purchase 
of counterfeit goods that sellers falsely represented wore. new and genuine. Badart Decl. '\'113-12; 
Byron Dec!. W 7-16, 20; Lahood Dec!. W 4-8, 14. All of these consumers complained to eBay 
andlor PayPal. Badart " Decl " ')14; Byron Decl. 1)17; Lahood Dec!. ~ 9. For instance, in 
November 2005, Elizllbeth Badart purc11ased what she believed to be genuine Tiffany bracelet 
and earrings from an eBay seller. Badarl Decl. '17. Once she received them, it was dear to her 
that the "Tiffany" items were fake. Badar! Dec!. 1) 11. Ms. Badart complained to PayPa! on 
"November 8, 2005, and it took repeated efforts over tbe next month before Pay Pal sent her a 
refund. Baldart Ded. ~114-20. 
Reporting listings through the VeRO program \\'~ an arduous and unsatisfactory process. 
Cacucciolo Dec!. '\'1142, 45-48; Zalewska Decl. 'it'/83-85, 87-88; Tr. 203:21-207:3. Because 
Tiffany could not evaluate a listing any sooner than: any member of the public, • counterfeit 
Tiffany item was often sold before Tiffany has a cnance to report t'u: listing. Cacucciolo Dec!. 
1) 47; PX 1075; PX Ion; PX 1078. MoreOver, there wore overwhelming numbers of ''Tiffany'' 
.Iistings on eBay at any given time. Tr.203:21-205:8. ZElewska Dec!. 1 83; Cacucciolo Dec!. 
1147. From early 2003 through 2006, a search for "Tiffany" and "silver" could return upward of 
1,000 resulrs. Zaiewska Dec!. 'i83. Because eBay required a good faith belief that every listing 
is infunging in order for a righis owner to report it, II. 626:21-628:4, Tiffany had to review each 
and every listing before it could submit NOel's. l,alC\Vska Dec!. fJ27, 34-35. Yet, Tiffany 
simply could not review every "Tiffany" listing in a day. ZElewska Decl.1j 83; Tr. 203 :21-205:8. 
This problem was compounded by the ract that new items were con;tantly being added to t~e " 
-15-
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site, and Tiffany just could not keep up. Zalewske Decl. 1]83; Caeace;oic Doo1.1l47; Tr. 204:8-
204:15. 
D. "Bay Has Failed to Stop the Listin~ of eouaterfe.t TIffan" Silver Jew.in 
eBay relies on its VeRO program to show that it is purportedly respondh~g to the listings 
of counterfeit goods. Chesnut Decl. 1115; eBay Proposed Findings of Fact 1l'I! 9-14. Tnat 
program shills the responsibility to the rights owners such as Tiffany, Chesnut DecL W 15-17, 
and enables eBay to profit from the sale of counterfeit merchandise unless and until the rights 
owner submits a NOel with respect to a listL."1.g and eBay acts b.efore a sale is concluded_ 
When Tiffany submitted NOCl's to cBay, eBay took listings down. Zalewska DecL '/87. 
However, as noted above,. there is no evidence thq,r eBay took any long term actions against the 
sellers listings those goods (i&, whether it banned Illose sellers from using eBay to sell goods). 
See this Memo at 11, supra. Nor did eBay ever investigate whether Tiffany's or its customers' 
complaints were valid. T'.682:24-684: 15. 
Tiffany found 1hz.t using the VeRO program to eliminate the 'listing of counterfeit goods 
was both frustrating and insufficienL Kowalski Decl. 1119; Zmewska Decl. W 83-85, 87-88. 
The VeRO program did not meaningfully mitigate, let alone eradicate the problem, as eBay's 
own data shows that, between April 2000 and August 2005, 456,55t pieces of Tiffany silver 
jewelry were sold on eBay in spite of all of the NOCl's submitted by Tiffany. PX 394. 
eBay contends that it used its "fraud ""gine" to review listings of Tiffany goods and that 
it proactively took down such listings on its own without getting any notices from Tiffany. 
Chesnut Deci. 1i11 37-38; Tf. 664:4-665:3; DX 125. However, eBay produced no evidence 
regarding the number listings that it purportedly took down, Tr. 594:13-594:17, nor produced 
any evidence at trial of any examples of listings that it- proactively took down. 
-16-
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eBay's fraud engine was inherently insufficient te do the job. Pialetsky-Shapiro Dec!. 
~1 17-26. The filters that eBay employed looked exclusively for listinll' that admitted that the 
goods were not genuL, •. Piatetsky-Shapiro Dec!. '~18-24; DX 135; PX 1096. Thus, the fraud 
engine could not detect listings that falsely stated that the goods were new and genuine. 
Piatetsky-Shapiro Decl. 'jf24; Tr. 738:12-740:20. 
Aller it saw in August 2003 that Tiffany bad becom.e the second largest reporter ul1der 
the VeRO program, see DX 81, eBay contends that it tool< action to address that problem. 
Tr. 743:13-744:20. According to eBay, the plan was to adopt better filters to detect the sale of 
counterfeit goods. Kammerath Dep.108:24-109:22; Tr.744:10-744:20. Yet, eBay never 
'adopted any new filters other than the "replica" filters that it hed always used. See PX 1096; 
Piatetsky-Shapiro Decl. ~, 18-24. The failure of eBay to take any Willer action is corroborated 
by the growing numbm of NOel's that Tiffany filed each year.17 PX 1082; Zalewska Decl. 
~P4-78. 
eBay could have taken steps to implement filters and other measures to preveot the sale 
of counterfeit merchandise. Piatetsky-Shapiro Decl. ,/14; Tr. 664:<Hi64:22, 659:10-659:13, 
. 665:4-665:11, 738:12-740:20. Yet, it did Dot do so. Piatetsky-Shapiro Declaration, 14, 54; 
. Tr. 324:16-325:18. For iOSlance, in late 2006, eBay began to delay the ability of buyers to view 
·on the website listi.l1gS thaI use certain brand names, inchu:1iog Tiffany, for 6 to 12 bours in order 
to conduct manual reviews of these listinll'. .Tr.655:23-656:14. e8ay uses that delay to 
n eBay disputes that such en inference should be drawn from the increasing number of resources 
devotdto VeRO reporting by Tiffan.y. Tr. 100:14-100:18 Ho~'ever, during the period 2003 through 
:2005, when. Tiffany employed approximately the same level of rcsmm:es for VeRO reporting, see 
Tr. 83:9-84:2, Zalewska DCj:1.167, those notices steadily increased. PX 1082. Thus, Tiffany's iner ... e 
in reso\l.!ces devoted to VeRO reporting in .2006 C3IlllOt be used to dispute that the problem. continued to 
grow after Ms. Kammerath's commeuts in Au.:,oust 2003. ' . 
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detennir,e wheiher the sellers will be allowEd to offer such items. Tr. 654:9-654:23. Yet, as 
early as 2004, it was technically feasible for eBoy to delay listings, including for "Tiffany 
silver". Tr.665:4-665:11. It also was feas,wle in 2004.for eBay to implement quantity filters 
that flagged listings offering multiple items. Tr. 659: 10-659:13. Had eBay employed these 
filters at that time, an eBay CSR could have reviewed such listings, as well as the sellers ' other 
listings. Tr. 666:1-667:2. If the CSR found lbal the flagged listing· or any of the sellers' other 
listings were " suspicious", the CSR could have ta.~en them down. Tr.587:19-589:24. 
eBay's filters for "Tiffany" items were also inadequate because they were applied to ody 
one listing at a time. PiatetsJ..-y-Shapiro Decl. 1j 17; Tr. 354:6-354:19. Since eBay's seUers or' 
counterfeit goods tend to offer many items for sale, a more effective approach would have been 
to apply thc filters to sellers with characteristics indicative of. counterfeiter. Piatetsky-Shapiro 
Decl. ~ 17, Tiffany's expert, Dr. Gregory Piatetsk.-y-Shapiro, has been a leader in the field of data 
miIring since its beginnings in the late 19808. Piatetsky-Shapiro Deel. f[2-6; PX 1041. He 
demonstrated that, usiog data mining techniques commonly used by corporailons, eBay could . 
have designed programs ,Ibat identified listings. of likely counterfeit Tiffa.~y items and the sellers 
Ibereof. Piatetsh.-y-Shapiro Decl. 1ffl14, 26-29; Tr. 357:3-357: 15. Indeed, Dr. Piatet8ky-
Sbapiro's "suspiciousness" criteria come directly from eBay's.owi1 documents for its CSRs 
describing the indiciaof"suspicious" behavior. ' Pia\etsky-Shapiro Decl. 'Jjf 30-31; PX 340,344 
at 5-6,10-12; Tr. 324:16-325:10; Fultz Dep. 68:7-68:11, 77:16-78:5, 81:1-82:2, 85:1 -88:1, 94:5-
103:23, 
ARGUMENT 
A party is liable for contributory trademark infringement if it has "intentionally inducer d] 
.another to infringe a trademark," or has continued to offer its services to those other parties 
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I n February 2009, the market resecrch team at Rosetta Stone designed and conducted a survey with the 
, to measure the equity of the Rosetta Stone brand. 
;A respondents' panel was purchased from GMt. 1,300 
lAmericans older than IS completed the survey. The reo 
!spondents are representative fo r the US population older 
[than 18. 
i . 
fThe findings of the stUdy reveal that Rosetta Stone has a 
Ivery strong brand. 
I 
, 
I 
" 
iRos-etta Stone llas much higher awa reness thon the other 1 
la nguage brands in the USA: . 
, 
! -45% unaided brand awareness vs. 6% for the next best 
,brand 
! 
i ~ 74% aided awareness (brand rEcogn ition) VS. 23% for 
Ithe next best brand. 
, I 
!Rosetta Stone domina tes t he consideration set and this in- I 
jcreases signifcantty the likelihood that a pi!rson interested ~ 
!in lane:uage learning would rather buy Rosetta Stone than i 
!anv other language brand. Rosetta Stone is the number 1 ! 
jbrand in the consideration set for 54% of the Americans i 
:who are currently shopping for language learning vs. 5% . 
ltor the next be;;t brand. : 
!Rosetta Stone has a strong and well defined brand person- I 
lality. tt is perceived as a competent ane exciting brand. 
iThe financial val'.Je of the brand is estimated to be at least I 
:S61M: The brand commands a 42% price premium over 
!the next best brand: BerlItz. I 
I L __ ! ! Ll 
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~ntroduction 
.1 n February 2009, the market research team at Roser"1.d 
! Stone designed and conducted a survey with the 
kO dl to measure the equity of the Rose~ Stone br.and. A , . 
.respondents' panel "vas purchased from GMI. 1,300 Amerl-l 
:cans older tban 18 (:ornpler.ed the survey. The respondenfs , 
~re representative forthe US population older than I S. I 
, 
~here is no shortage of definitions of brand equity. Kevin 
keller defines brand equity as the "differential effect . 
p,at brand knowledge has on consumer response to the 
;marketing of that brand" {"Branding and Brand Equityn. 
page 7). Davfd Aaker defines brand equity as a set of four 
~ategories of brand assets: awareness, perceived quality, 1 
prand associations, and brand loyalty. We created OUf sur· 
Ney starting with David A?ker's Srand Equity Ten and Young! 
:and Rubicam's Brand Asset Valuator but we dId nor. ad- I 
~ere strictly to any particular model. We created a rather l ~ectic model that captures the perc.eptions about Rosetta! 
;stone that in our experier.ce play a Significant role In the i 
t!)Osumer decision-making proc.ess. The only relatively I 
Jntacl readily available mcdel that we used in the questlon~ 
)'laire wa:i Jennifer Aaker's brand personality scale. 
IThe report follows the flow of the survey quesdonnalre. I ~irst we report the awareness with the brand and its com- I ~etitors. The." we present the data about the perceptions : 
~ai the brand and the brand personality. The presentation i 
~ndude5 a calculation of the re lative financial equity of the ' 
~rand based on a dlQice-based conjoint <juestion that was t 
fnduGed in the .5urvey. 
I 
, 
,Brand Awareness 
:Unaided AwarellCSS 
i 
lQuestion: What language leaming brands are you aVJ<lr~ 
I of? Ple:)5c type in ttl!:!: oox below .11 brand names that 
:came to mind wher. you think of language lea rning. 
L-1.. 
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~ideti AwarenEss (Bl-and Recognitio;;) 
I" uestion: Have you ever heard of the following lan-
'\.,..(.guage learning brands? Select all that apply_ 
8rand ill Percent 
Rosetta Stone 967 74.2% 
Berlitz 305 23.4% 
Muz.z.y 125 9.6% 
BaIl'oQs ' 122 94% 
B.bbel.com 99 7.6% 
(eaniSpanishToday.com 86 '6:6% 
BBC Lnnguages 86 6.6% 
P~leur '6Q 5.3% 
Living Language 55 4.2% 
In~~tJl'4Inei·s ion:· 50 '3,8%, 
Trmsparent 32 2.5% 
iT~jl.'i , ;21 : ~j 0/0 
Rocket Languages 25 1.9% 
EligliihBaby'.com '25 .'1.9% 
Fluenz 23 1.8% 
BYki.com 21 ' ' 1.6% 
LiveIDocha 18 1.4% 
NI:apgolaaguages 14 1.1% 
[ have ::lOt heard of any 233 17.9% 
of these brands 
Toml·. 1300 
, 
cm~FIDENTIAL 
, 
Brand Equ!ty (Conjoint Anaiysis) 
\ 
,we asked the respondent!> to complete a conjoint tas.k . 
as part of the que:stionnalre. In this task VIC asked ' 
t he respondents to make a choice between three product . 
:offerings. E3Ch offering was defined with three attributes: 
brand, price, and product description. 
, 
, 
The brands used were: Rosetta Stone, 8erlitz, Auralog, 
p imsJeur, and fluenz. 
~e product descriptions were: language software pro~ 
rram. language school, language audio CD/tapes. 
re price range was from 250 to 450 with $50 intef1.o;;li.!;. 
)'he respondents would see on the screen the following 
task: 
! 
\ 
t'lmagfne that you were looking for a solution to learn a 
foreign language and you were offered the tol!owing op-
~om:. Which one would you chose 7" 
Option 1:. Brand: Rosetta Stone; Product: language soft-~;are prog ram; Price: 400 
I 
;opnon 2: Brand: Pimsleur; Product: language school; 
Price: 450 
i , 
pptlon 3: Brand: Berlitz; Product: language software pro-
~ram; Price: 250 
~ption 4: None of these" 
I 
trne respondents had to make this choice eight times ai 
~he componerltS. within each option were randomly varied. : 
Based on their responses we derived the relative impor-
~ance of each attribute (brand, price, and product) in their ! 
~ecision making and the preference that they have for the 1 
~evels wfthin each attribute. For example. the !evels within t 
~he Brand attribute are the different brands: Rosettu Stone,! 
~erlitz. etc. : 
I . 
jThe relative importance of the .ttributes is: 
r--ver.lge Importances 
~ttribute 
! 
rrand 
Product/Service 
! 
~rice 
! 
Tota l 
27.63 
9.59 
62.77 
1>rfce is1he most important attribute and it el<plil in~ 63% of: 
! ~he dedsion making process. . 
.. ~_i _ ! 
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. :i 
;r."e table below displavs the average ublit" (or the average! 
';CustomN preference) for each le\lel within the attributes. ~ 
i 
Resoaling Method: Zero-Centered Diffs 
Total 
Rosetta Stone 60.91 
Ber!itz 1-2.79 
Auralog (Tell me More) -21.99 
Pimsleur -15.85 
Fluellz -20.28 
18Jlguage software pro- 16.62 
gram 
pri '/l:lte language school -4.45 
language audio CDs/au- -12.16 
dio tapes. 
Price: $250 100.33 
Price: $300 48.50 
I'llC': $350 -2.58 
Price: $4(]0 -58.26 
Price: $450 -87.98 
: 
;me customer preferences are expressed as zero-centered 
:diff~. Rosett;a Stone is the most preferred brand and Aura-
'og is the least preferred. lc!nguage software is the most 
'prefem!d product .md audio tapes/COs is the least pre- i 
ierred product. . ! 
~sing Sawtooth Advanced Market Simulator, we ran OJ m<lrj 
~et simulation to determine what the market shares of the 
f,ve brands would be under the fo llowing circumstances; I 
, 
I 
! 
! 
1} All brands enjoy 100% brand awareness 
2) AU brands off~r the same product 
3) ·AII brands sell this product at the same price: 
~250. 
;Under these conditions, the m;;rket shares of the five com-! 
~anies would be: 
Product Share of Preference 
Rosetta Srune 34.19 
Berlitz 18.54 
Auralog 15.22 
Pimsleur 16.49 
Fluenz 15.56 
, 
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~ven though tha assumptions in this simulation are unre- , 
filistic, this is not a purel', academic exercise. Our ultimate : 
igoal is to determine how much more or less Vlould a po- ' 
l ential customer pay for Rosetta. Stone in a purchasing situ-; 
~tion when this customer has all five br;;nds in the can sid-
;eratiol1 set. In order to answer this question, we increased : 
'grodually t he price for Rosette; Stone keeping ail other . 
~ariables fixed until the Rosetta Stone share of oreference : 
hccame equal to the Bertitz' shdre of preferenc~. The price j 
'at which th;$ happens is S3SS. When we divided 355/250, , 
~e determined the price premium that somebody wO:Jld : 
pe wiliing to pc:;y for Rosetta Stane over Be rlitz, the second i 
:mcst \laludble brand. It is 42%. 
i . A- different w~ to express this premium is to calculate how! 
much iess sales Rosetta Stone would have made in 2008 if 
its n(lme were Seditl. We calculated that we wou ld have 
~old $61.5M less li the name of the companv we~e Berlitz I 
instead of Rosetta Stone. Thus, the relative equity of the j 
brand expressed in financial terms is <It least $61.SM. If we: 
~ompare Roseaa Stone to less established competitors like i 
Plmsle:Jr, this number will incre<:lse. 
, 
, 
:Rosetta Stone in the Buying Consider-
)ltion Set 
:we asked the respondent.s if they were shopping ! 
i around for d Id nguage learning program. 264 respon.j 
:dents, or 20% said "yes H • Then we asked them to type the ! 
~op three brands in their consideration set. Most people 
\vere able to rccalt only one brand and a good quarter or 
\he 264 respondents • ...... ho are currently shopping around 
for a language product/service could not reedit e\fen one 
prand . 
I 
Number of brands in the consideration set 
N Percent 
Three hrands; or more 29 11% 
Two brands 39 15% 
One brand 130 49% 
NOlle 66 25% 
Total 264 
~osetta Stone is the top brand in the consider.3tion set. 
; , 
Top I brand N Percent of shoppers 
Rosetta Stone 143 54.2% 
Berlitz 12 4.5% 
Pimsleur 3 l.l% 
For Dummies 3 l.l% 
Video Professor 2 0.8% 
Tow! Sbopp"" 264 
- .. -
- -
-
._-
, 
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p4% of all shoppers indicate Rosetb Stone is the brand that they put on the top of the list. Berlitz is next with only 4.5% 
:of the respondents indicating it is lhe top brand they consider. 
~nother 4.5% indicate Rosetta Stone is number two in their consideration set and 5% indicate Bertitz is their number 
'two. 
~hus,59% of the shoppers put Rosetta Stone in their cons ideration sets while 4l% did not. 9% put Berlitz in theiicon- ' 
~ideration sets and 91% did not. 
'we. tried to profile the respondents who wefe shopping for a language product/service but did not have Rosetta Stone 
~n their consideration set but our attempt was not successful. They were not different from the group of respondents 
~ho were shopping a round for a language product/service and had Rosetta Sbne in their consideration set. Both groups . 
~ ... erE' similar in terms of gender. income, age, .and media habits {reading newspaper.;/maga'lines, watching TV, listening : 
:to radio). The only tangible difference is that the respondents who shop fo r language products and have Rosetta Stone in : 
rheir cons iduation set are slightly more educated than the other group. 
)<nowledge about the Brand 
I 
~Ne asked the respondents how much they knew about the company and how they have learned aboul Rosetta 
I Stone. 
I 
I hem:d of it but know nothing aboul il 
J know something about j [ . 
1 know a lot about it 
Total 
I jNe also asked all respondents how they h.we heard of Rosetta Stone. 
TV ad 
Print ad (magazine, newspaper. etc.) 
Radio ad 
Rosetta Stone's web site 
From somebody I know (friend, relative, colleague, etc. ) 
Expert n:vie::.w (ouJine::. llr ill a ut::w::;pap=r, magazint, t!tc.) 
Search engine (Google. Yahoo, etc.) 
Bookstore 
Library 
I llave seen a Rosetta Stane retail kiosk 
How did you hear about Rosetta Stone'! - User review (blog, online 
review, etc.) 
How did you hear about Rosetta S(Olle? - Amazon 
*Only respondents who know something or a lot about Rosetta 
SmDe. 
L 
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N 
829 
413 
62 
1304 
N 
367 
125 
69 
85 
124 
45 
69 
52 
32 
83 
23 
26 
Percent 
63.6 
31.7 
4.8 
100.0 
Percent of 
respouse::; 
33.4% 
11.4% 
6.3% 
7.7% 
11.3% 
4.1% 
6.3% 
4.7% 
2.9% 
7.5% 
2.1% 
2.4% 
Percem of 
n::::;'-P0lldeUl::; 
79.4% 
27.1% 
14.9% 
18.4% 
26.8% 
9.7% 
14.9% 
11.3% 
6.9% 
18.0% 
5.0% 
5.6% 
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~e also asked all respondents if they had seen a TV com-
p,ercial for Rosetta Stone. 
Frequen- Percent 
cy 
nu 308 23.6 
not sure 188 14.4 
yes 808 62.0 
TOlal 1304 100.0 
N Percent 
r dislike it very mucb 3 .6 
I dislike ic 3 .6 
I neither like it nor dislike it 159 33.5 
r like it 238 ~0.1 
[ like it very much 72 15.2 
Total 475 100.0 
; 
~-... 
1 
I 
J 
~ 
B I don' t know 
D Sorne-~vhat disagree 
Q Somewhat agree 
ROH!tta St{ln~ is changing th!! \· ... iI~· the wor(d Ie:am s 
languages - Q20 
:=!o'iatta Stone is an kmo'J:ative thOllght leade r in 
t he fi '!!d of languagt {earni;lg - ru9 
It is" fU:"i to study '~ I,mguage \"'i!h Rosetta Ston'! -
Q18 
Rose:tta St:me is ciiff~re.nt from otherfangue:ge 
1'2: ~ming brands - Ql7 
Ros:etta Stone, is good \{:1lu~ forfhe money -0.16 
Rosetta Ston'! is growing in popularit)· -UlS 
Ros e:tta Stone is a leading brand in lengua~~ 
leamlng - 0.14 
AosettoStcne is a high qlJality brclnd -Q13 
CONFIDENTIAL 
II Strongly dIsagree 
II'J N either agree nor disagree 
ra Strongly agree 
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Vie asked tht: respolldents to express their agreement ur 
disagreement with a series of st:1temellts about Rosetta 
Stone. The resulls are summarized in the table below. 
~------...... ----------------------; 
e strongly disagree 
s: some ....... !1atagree 
F3 sOIlle\vhat disagree 
U; 'i trongly "gree 
Rosetta Stone is a perfect company for 
people like me- 024 
When t see an advertisement from Rosetta 
Stone, I know the infomlation in it is ... 
· ! Ro)etta Stone is interested in more than just 
i 
L 
selling me a product -- nIl 
I highly reSllect Rosetta Stone- 0.21 
How effective is Rosett:; Stone at teaching foreign. languages'! 
I don' l know 
very ineffecu ve 
somewhat ineffectivt: 
neither effective nor ineffective 
somewhat effective 
very~ffective 
Frequency Percem 
78 16.4 
5 1.1 
3 .6 
49 10.3 
185 38.9 
155 32.6 
How convenient is to study a foreign language with RS'! 
Frequency Percent 
Ido.', know 60 12.6 
very inconvenient 
sumewhat incunveni~n[ 
neither co.uvenientllor illconvenient 
somewhat convenienr 
very convenient 
2 .4 
9 1.9 
39 8.2 
179 37.7 
186 39.2 
How effective is Rosetta Stone at teaching foreign languages? 
I don't know 
very ineffective 
somewhat ineffective 
neither effective nor ineffective 
somewhat effective 
very effective 
Frequency Percent 
78 16.4 
5 l.J 
3 .6 
49 10.3 
185 38.9 
155 32.6 
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g neither agree nor di'Sagree 
. ___ .1 
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Brand Personality 
We asked the respondents to rate the personality of me brand using Jennifer Aaker's brand personality scale with some slight modifications. '"Imagine Rosena Stone as a person who you know. TI'llS may 
sound un~sual. but think of [he sel of human ch:!racreristics associated with the Rosella Smne brand. For 
<::xa,inplt:, yuu might think that the human thamcu:ri~ti(;S assuciated. with Pepto Bismul are kind, wann, t.:aring, 
soothing, gentle. uustworthy. and dependable. The human charaClelistics associated with Dr. Pepper might 
be non-co:llonning. fun. ~"1teres tiJlg, exciting. and-offbeat. \Ve are interesled in finding out which personality 
rraits or human characteristics come to mind when you think of Rosena Stone. Ple£lSe rate each item on the 
:;ccle of 1 to S ... 
Only respondeuts who kuew somefr!ing or a lot about Rosetta Stone answered this question. Jemlifer Aaker 
divides brand personality i.nto five main dimensioo..s: sincerity, excitement, competence, sophistication, and 
ruggetieness. Each dimemion consists of several persollCllity traits. Below we present the tiata findings orga-
nized into five dimensions and th.en we offer our interpretation of the ftndL."1gs. 
Sincerity 
not at all 2 3 4 extremely 4+5 
descriptive descriptive 
Down-tO-earth - Q28 Brand Personality 2.3% 5.5% 31.8% 45.7% 14.7% 60.4% 
Fam.ily-oriented 1.7% 7.8% 31.8% 41.1% 17.7% 58.7% 
Small-town 13.9% 26.9% 36.4% 18.1% 4.6% 22.7% 
Honest 1-5% 2.5% 26.3% 46.3% 23 .4% 69.7% 
Sincere 23% 3.4% 26.9% 45_5% 21.9% 67.4% 
Real 1.5% 1.9% 18.1% 45.9% 32.6% 78.5% 
Wholesome 3.2% 6.3% 38.9% 31.8% 19.8% 51.6% 
Original 1.5% 5.5% 21.5% 38.1% 33.5% 71.6% 
ChtertUl 3.4% 8.0% 36.8% 34.7% 17.1% 51.8% 
Sentim~mal 10.3% 25.1% 37.7% 20.4% 6.5% 26.9% 
Fliendly 2.1% 4.8% 23.4% 44.8% 24.8% 69.7% 
Approaclu:hle 2 .3% 4.8% 22.7% 42.1% 28.0% 70.1% 
Within the Sincerity dimension, the Rosetta Stone brand is perceived as mostly real. approachable, friendly, 
honest, and sincere. 1l1e lowe£[ scores within this dimension are on Small-town and Sentimental. 
The average percent of people who beieve the Sincerity dimension describes Rosetta Slane (4+5 ou the scale) 
is 58.3%. 
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Excitement (modified) 
not at all 2 3 4 extremely 4+5 
descriptive descriptive 
Fun 1.9% 3.69'0 28.0% 40.8% 25.7% 66.5% 
Daring 5.7% j6.4% 37.7% 25.5% 14.7% 40.2% 
Trendy 2.9% 7.8%- 27.2% 39.8% 122.3% 62.1% 
Exciting 2.5% 4.4% 29.9% 39.6% 23.6% 63.2% 
Spirited 4.2% 9.5% 30.1% 39.4% 16.8% 56.2% 
Cool 1.7% 7.6% 31.8% 38.7% 20.2% 58.9% 
Young 5.5% 12.6% 35.890 28.8% 17.3% 46.1% 
Imaginative [,5% 3.2% 20.6% 46.1% 28.6% 74.7% 
Uuique 1.5% 5.9% 20.8% 36.6% 35.2% 71.8% 
Innovative 1.3% 3.6% 17.3% 4?1% 35.8% 77.9% 
Up-to·date 1.5t]"o 1.1% 14.5% 41.3% 41.7% 82.9% 
COlltwlporary 2.1% 4.6% 22.7% 4Ll% 29.)% 70.5% 
Within this dimension Rosena Stone is pert:eiveu mosuy as up-to~date. irmovative, imaginative, and ulliqu~. 
The lowest scores are OO·dEl'iUg. young. and cool. The average percent of people who beieve £Itt: Excitement 
uimensiun uC::l$laiiJt:s Rosena Stune: (4+5 un the scale:) is 64.7%. 
Competence 
Hot at all 2 3 4 e.x.rremely 4+5 
descliptive descripti ... ·e 
Reliable 1.3% 2.5% 21.9% 42.5% 31.8% 74.3% 
HW'u-workiIlg 2.5% 4.6% 29.1% 36.2% 27.6% 63.8% 
Secure 2.5% 4.2% 31.4% 36.4% 25.5% 61.9% 
Intelligent 1.5% 1.9% 15.2% 43.6% 37.9% 81.5% 
Technical 2.1% 7.2% 27.8% 38.5% 24.4% 62.9% 
C0l1lorate 4.2% 11.6% 34.3% 29.9% 20.0% 49.9% 
Succes£ful 1. 1% 3.4% 15.6% 142.9% 37.1% 80.0% 
Leader 2.3% 3.4% 18.3% 39.4% 36.6% 76.0% 
Confident 2.7% 2.5% 20.6% 43.2% 30.9% 74.1% 
ProfesSional .6% 1.5% 13.7% 4 1.9% 42.3% 84.2% 
Within this dimension Rosetta Stone is perceived mostly as professional, intelligent, successful. 2Dd a leader. 
The lowest scores are on coporate, technicaL secure, and hard-working. The c.veragc percem of people who 
beieve the Competence dimension describes Rosetta Stone (4+5 011 the scale) is 70.9%. 
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~opnistication 
i , 
not at all 2 3 i4 extremely 4+5 
descriptive descriptive 
Uppr.:r-class 4.0% 11.8% 33.1% 29.5% 21.7% 51.2% 
GlamufVU!: 10.1% 21.3% 38.1% 18.5% 12.0% 30.5% 
Good looking 11.6% 14.3% 34./% 26.1% 13.3% 39.4% 
Chmming 10.1 % 16.2% 33.1% 23.8% 11.8% 40.6% 
Feminine 24.&% 25.5% 35.4% 9.1% <"" .... :J ,0 14.3% 
Smooth 10.1 % 13.7% 41.5% 24.4% 10.3% 34.7% 
, 
, 
'Within this dimension Roseti~ SlOne is perceived mostly as cham.llllg. and upper-class_ TIle lo\vest scores are 
p n smoOth, feminine . and glamorolls. The average percent of peopie who beieve the Sophistication dimension 
~escribes Rcsetta Stone (4+5 au the s.cale) is 35. 1%. 
, 
Mre orrasticully changed. the last d imension in Jennifer Aaker's personality scalt leaving only cwo traits in tbe 
~questionnaire: tough. and masculine. Both of them were not found to be descriptive of rhe Rosetta Stone brand. : 
! 
To p personality rraits (above 70% rare 4 and 5) 
Profi:ssional 84.2% 
Up-to-date 82.9% 
Intelligent 81.5% 
Successful 80.0% 
Reol 78.5% 
Inno1l8ti,"e 77.9% 
Leader 76.0% 
ImaDinative 74.7% 
Reliable 74.3% 
Confident 74.1% 
Unique 71.8% 
Original 71 .6% 
Contemporary 70.5% 
Approacbable 70.1% 
, 
Six of these personality traits belong to the Competence brand personality di-
F ension and s i x belong to the Excitement brand personality dimensio·n~ Overall, 
~he Americans perceive Rosetta Stone as one competent and exciting company. 
i 
i 
; 
, 
! 
l 
I 
j 
, 
, 
I 
I 
I 
I 
, 
i 
i 
I 
I 
i 
! , 
Dnly tWO of the top i>erson3lity Lraits belong to the Sincerity bra..T1d personality dimension: rea.l, and npproach-
kble . It is important for a company to build a relationship widt its acrual and poteDtial customers and dus can· 
~ot be accomplished withoul e~tablish.iDg a relationspjp of trust That is why we believe that it is important for J 
iRosetta Stone to put an emphasis ou enhancing. tile Sincerity dimension of iLS brand personality. In order for : 
people EO relate to [P.e brand. w.ey need to believe that Rosetta Stone is not only competent and exciting but also ; 
~ sincere, dowu-to-earth compally. 
i , 
, 
L 
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Interest in Language Learning 
, we aSke.d a ques tion about the gen~ral interest in learning a language: how interested are you in learning 
. a foreIgn language? 
; 
, Frequency Percent 
n9t at all interested 281 21.5 
somewha.t uuiuterested 138 10.6 
, 
, neither interested nor uniu- 137 10.5 
! terested 
; 
somewhat wferested 458 35.1 
I very interested 290 22.2 
; Total 1304 100 i 
! 
1 We explored the possible relnrionships between interest in l!Ulguage leaming and other variables and we 
i discovered one strong relationShip: between age and interest iu language ieaming. Younger Americans are 
~ much more likely to be interested. illlaoguage learning than older Americans. While 43% of the Americans 
1 between 18 and 22 years old are imeres ted in ianguage learning. only 8% of the A.mericans older Ehan 65 are 
j interested in language leaming. I -
Age and interest in languages 
65 and above 
55-64 
45-54 
A g: Not at all interested 
g 35-44 g Somewhat t.:ninteres ted 
e 
30-34 .. Neutrol 
Ell Somewhat interested 
23-29 
~ Very interest ed 
18-22 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 
Percent of Americans 
i The discovery of this strong relationship between age and inte(~st in language learning prompted us to see if 
! there is !l relationship between age and interest in buying a language produc[ or service. 
i 
L 
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;We discovered thaI younger people a-e more likely 
jo be on the market shopping around for a language 
learning product/sen',ce than older people. 
Age and shopping for language 
products 
:.,.~ No m Yes 
;65 and ebove 
I 55-64 
i 
, :=~:t~=t:~~(~:;~"~ '-'''--T<'Al">~'''" r .. · ! 
45-$4 '";t::i;.::~:;:';'Y-~~K.;c.~:t,~""~"f 
35-44 ... ;;sJ,·~!J>.;;.~k . .,.,~' m~ 30-34~...L':"-L_...J .•. ~_~ ~!~;~ t-:~· -:~:'~:::;:::~t~:~~::~:~~r:~"'::·~::~t~;~:l!_::~~;;;;~;; 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% f
i Percent who shop for a language 
product/service 
~5% of the Americans in !.heir twenties are res.dy to 
puy a language product or service versus only 6% of 
(he Amelican~ older than 65. 
frhese findings reinfort:'e a reco[nmendalion Liar we ~aye previously made: the Youth segment is an RI-
~active segment and Rosetta Stoue slJoulci make a 
6ttong effort to penetrate this segment by aligning il'i 
!cntire marketing and product strategy with this goal. 
i 
f 
i 
I 
._' _1_. 
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Conclusion 
The findings of the study reveal that Rosp.tta Stone has i .~~~~ ! 
It has much higher awareness than the other languCige 
broods in the USA. 
it alsa dominates the consideration set increasing signi f. I 
cantly' the likelihood thelt a person InterestEd In language; 
learning would rather buy Rosetta Stone than any other ! 
language brand. 
Rosetta Stone is perceived as iii competent and exciting 
brand. 
The finanCial value of the bf3nd ;s estimated to be at 
least $61M. The brand commands a 42% price premium 
uver the next best br.and: Berlitz. 
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